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Abstract:  
The paper assesses non-training firm’s potential for free-riding on the training efforts of firms 
that train apprentices. In order to assess potential free-riding, the paper analyses whether 
training or non-training firms are more likely to recruit apprenticeship graduates that have 
been trained elsewhere. Firms without apprenticeships are less likely to hire apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere than training firms. If these firms do hire apprenticeship 
graduates, they hire a smaller proportion compared to all new-hired skilled workers that have 
an apprenticeship degree than training firms. The paper discusses three potential explanations 
for this finding: lower demand for apprenticeship graduates, information disadvantage and 
apprentices’ preferences. 
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Introduction 
The willingness of firms to provide apprenticeship training is of major interest to understand 
incentives of those firms that invest in employees transferable skills. Firms’ investments in 
transferable skills increase the risk of firms free-riding since competitors can poach the newly 
trained skilled workers (Harhoff and Kane, 1997; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Stevens, 
2001; Leuven, 2005; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). For countries considering adopting an 
apprenticeship training system, the risks of poaching and free-riding are a feared obstacle and 
detrimental to firms’ willingness to invest in apprentices transferable skills.  
Despite its relevance, empirical evidence on potential free-riding is scarce. Empirical studies 
usually focus on the provision of apprenticeship programs. On the contrary, this paper argues 
that understanding potential free-riding of non-training firms requires an analysis of the 
recruitment strategy comparing non-training and training firms. Such analysis can show 
whether non-training firms are able to hire graduates immediately after apprenticeship and 
provides additional explanations for the functioning of apprenticeship training markets. 
The paper finds that non-training firms are seven percent less likely to hire apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere opposed to training firms. If non-training firm hired recent 
apprenticeship graduates, they hire a smaller proportion compared to all newly hired skilled 
employees over the course of a year.  
Previous theoretical arguments have focused on a low free-riding probability. The economic 
literature argues that market mechanisms, such as monopsony power which is based on 
information asymmetry, transaction costs or complementarities to specific skills, can prevent 
poaching (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Leuven, 2005; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). Political 
science literature discusses how employer coordination solves the commitment problem to 
training and reduce free-riding through information circulation, deliberation, monitoring and 
sanctioning (Soskice, 1994; Culpepper, 2001; Trampusch and Eichenberger, 2012).  
Nevertheless, these theoretical models do not explain whether certain firms are more likely to 
hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere despite a sizeable proportion of 
apprenticeship graduates leave immediately after training in occupations that require a high 
investment (Euwals and Winkelmann, 2004; Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2010; 
Göggel and Zwick, 2012). This paper discusses three mechanisms that influence the lower 
probability of non-training firms hiring apprenticeship graduates immediately after training. 
First, non-training firms might not have demand apprenticeship graduates as a condition of 
employment. Hence, there is no incentive to free-ride. Second, the group of training firms 
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might have an information advantage. These firms may gain an information advantage 
because training supervisors are also members of apprentices’ examination committees. Thus, 
they are in a better position to assess the quality of each apprenticeship graduate in 
comparison to all apprenticeship graduates in a respective training occupation. Additionally, 
these training firms have more insight into the quality of training among training firms. This 
superior knowledge gives training firms a competitive advantage in hiring switching 
apprenticeship graduates. Third, switching graduates may simply prefer to work for firms that 
actively support apprenticeship training. Empirically, this paper cannot reject the relevance of 
these three explanations. 
The apprenticeship training system 
The German apprenticeship training system follows a curriculum established by the 
Vocational Training Act and occupation-related training curricula. The Vocational Training 
Act describes necessary equipment and requirements training firms must fulfill in order to 
train apprentices to standard. Training firms need a permit for apprenticeship training which is 
granted by the chambers of industry and commerce or the chambers of craft. The training 
curricula describes the level of acceptable skills that at minimal needs to be trained to as well 
as the length of training for each specific occupation. Consequently, at the end of the training 
period apprentices will receive a graded skill certificate. Finally, the chambers centrally 
monitor apprenticeships and administer the final exams.  
These institutional settings impose a consistent and unambiguous definition of training across 
firms as well as transparent and visible skills. Apprenticeship graduates who receive training 
in different firms, but in the same occupation have a comparable and guaranteed minimum 
level of skills. In particular, institutional requirements severely limit a firms’ ability to 
structure apprenticeship training in a manner that is specific to the firm. Furthermore, 
apprenticeship training contracts are legally terminated on the day following the final exam. 
Thus, employment has to be negotiated at the end of the apprenticeship. Apprentices are free 
to switch employers after training. Therefore, training firms have to actively entice graduates 
to stay on as skilled workers; whereas in principle, non-training firms could easily hire them 
and free-ride on the efforts of training firms (Franz and Soskice 1995; Mohrenweiser et al. 
2013). 
Nevertheless, collective bargaining contracts increasingly protect apprenticeship graduates 
and entail retention clauses for training firms that may limit mobility after training. Since the 
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mid-90s, collective bargaining contracts with retention clauses in specific sectors went 
beyond pure appeals. An overview on the effects of these clauses on the retention rates by 
Bispinck et al. (2002) shows firms rarely changed their retention policy in the wake of these 
clauses. Instead, firms used the numerous remaining loopholes– for example by offering 
skilled jobs in faraway establishments or unattractive jobs as they trust that a lower than legal 
retention rate does not result in graduates or unions in taking legal action. 
The apprenticeship training system is the main route into the labor market and trains around 
two-thirds of a birth cohort. Immediately after graduation, around 66 percent of 
apprenticeship graduates stay in the training firm, and 75 percent are employed one month 
after graduation (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2010). The retention rate in the 
training firm decreases to 30 percent five years after apprenticeship completion (Winkelmann, 
1996). Moreover, during the first year post-graduation, around one-third of all graduates 
switch occupations. The retention rate, employment rate and rate of occupational switchers 
varies greatly between occupations and sectors (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 
2010).  
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Analyzing the decision of non-training firms to hire apprenticeship graduates incorporates two 
dimensions. First, do non-training firms demand apprenticeship graduates instead of 
experienced employees and second, if they demand apprenticeship graduates, do non-training 
firms have an (dis)advantage in hiring apprenticeship graduates compared to training firms. 
A firms’ demand for apprenticeship graduates depends on whether the firm sees graduates as 
perfect or imperfect substitutes to more experienced skilled workers with an apprenticeship 
degree. If both are perfect substitutes, firms may hire both depending on marginal cost/ 
benefit considerations. If both are imperfect substitutes, for example because employees learn 
additional and important skills during employment but not during apprenticeship, firms may 
prefer either type of workers. Imperfect substitution may cause firms to not (or occasionally) 
hire apprenticeship graduates and to not train apprentices at all. This leads to the first 
hypothesis that non-training firms are less likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere because they do not have a demand for them. 
If firms demand apprenticeship graduates, they have two options in principle. Firms can 
decide to train apprentices and employ their graduates afterwards. This decision refers to the 
investment training motive (Merrilees, 1983; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; Ryan and 
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Wolter, 2011).1 2 Contrarily, firms that demand apprenticeship graduates can decide to hire 
them from outside firms instead of providing apprenticeship training. This free-riding on the 
training efforts of other firms can imply poaching which is generally considered as a major 
obstacle for firms’ investment in transferable skills (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Stevens, 
2001; Leuven, 2005). Indeed, a firm can rely on both strategies train apprentices and 
additionally hire graduates trained elsewhere.  
Before addressing whether training or non-training firms that demand apprenticeship 
graduates are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere, I summarize the 
main established theoretical arguments as to why free-riding should be considered a minor 
issue. Economic theory argues that firms invest in apprentices’ transferable skills because of 
labor market imperfections such as information asymmetries, a regional monopsony power, 
transaction costs, complementarities to specific skills, collective agreements and minimum 
wages, all of which generate monopsony power for training firms. Monopsony power enables 
training firms to keep graduates and pay wages lower than productivity after apprenticeship 
training (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Leuven, 2005; Wolter and Ryan, 2011). 
Political science literature argues that employer coordination plays a major role in ensuring a 
firms’ commitment to apprenticeship training and restricts systematic free-riding. Employer 
associations manage the communication between firms and the government as well as 
amongst member firms by information circulation, deliberation, monitoring and sanctioning 
(Soskice, 1994; Culpepper, 2001, Trampusch and Eichenberger, 2012). Both economic and 
political science arguments state that poaching and free-riding should be of minor relevance 
which is empirically supported by Mohrenweiser et al. (2013). However, both arguments do 
not answer the question whether non-training firms are less likely to hire switching 
apprenticeship graduates despite 40 percent of apprenticeship graduates switching employers 
after training is completed (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2010). 
I propose a further argument why training firms might be more likely to hire apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere than non-training firms using arguments of economic theories of 
company-sponsored training investments. Training firms might have not only an information 
advantage against the market about the type of apprentices (Chang and Wang, 1995; 
Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998) or training content (Katz and Ziderman, 1990), but also the 
group of training firms has an information advantage against the group of non-training firms. 
Training firms are better situated to assess the quality of each graduate in comparison to all 
apprenticeship graduates in a respective training occupation as well as the quality of a training 
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firm in relation to other firms3. The information advantage is based on institutions such as that 
the training supervisors are also members of examination committees for exams in the 
chambers of industry and commerce or craft. Training firms thereby acquire information 
about the quality of outsider training firms and apprentices. This superior knowledge gives 
training firms an advantage in recruiting apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. They can 
distinguish between high and low productive switching apprentices and contingent the wage 
offer on apprentices’ type. On the contrary, non-training firms cannot distinguish between 
both types and therefore offer an average wage. Hence, high productive switching 
apprenticeship graduates are more likely to work for outsider training firms than for outsider 
non-training firms. Whereas, outsider non-training firms are more likely to end-up with less 
productive graduates. This mechanism may prevent non-training firms from hiring 
apprenticeship graduates or hire them occasionally4. This leads to the second hypotheses that 
training firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere than non-
training firms because of an information advantage. 
The argument about the information advantage of the group of training firms rests on the 
assumption that firms can decide whom to keep. However, signing an employment contract is 
a decision between the employer and employee. Apprenticeship graduates may prefer to work 
at a training firm rather than a non-training firm. Apprenticeship graduates may see a firms’ 
non-participation in apprenticeship training as an adverse signal about work-conditions or 
career possibilities (Backes-Gellner and Tuor, 2010). In this case, I also expect fewer 
apprenticeship graduates in non-training firms. 
I test the hypothesis whether training firms are more likely to hire switching graduates trained 
elsewhere than non-training firms. This finding is expected due to three potential 
mechanisms. First, non-training firms may not demand apprenticeship graduates, but prefer 
experienced employees with an apprenticeship degree. Second, the group of training firms 
collectively has an information advantage over the group of non-training firms in terms of the 
productivity of apprenticeship graduates and as such can offer superior contracts. Third, 
apprenticeship graduates prefer to work in training firms.  
However, I am not aware of any empirical paper analyzing a firms’ demand for 
apprenticeship graduates or firms’ recruiting strategy in regards to apprenticeship graduates. 
Somewhat related is a paper by Bellmann and Janik (2007) analyzing the impact of 
uncertainty in the recruitment of skilled workers and apprentices simultaneously. However, 
they do not focus on graduate recruitment and instead estimate a positive impact of the share 
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of skilled workers, employment growth and high investments on the recruitment of skilled 
workers. Moreover, a large strand of literature investigates firms’ motivation to train 
apprentices, whereby the investment training motive assumes that firms train because they 
demand the skills of apprenticeship graduates (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; 
Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010; Wolter and Ryan, 2011; Wenzelmann, 2012). 
Finally, empirical papers analyzing information asymmetries in labor markets usually focus 
on the relation between the current employer and outsider firms (the market). They typically 
compare the mover/ stayer wage differential between a group of employees that carries a 
stigma (the laid-off workers) and a group that does not carry this stigma - mostly displaced 
workers because of a plant closure (Grund, 1999; Göggle and Zwick, 2012) or military 
quitters (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). These studies do not include a variable training firm5. 
Data 
The paper uses the longitudinal version 2 of the IAB linked employer-employee data set 
(LIAB). The longitudinal version of the LIAB is composed of all establishments with three 
consecutive observations in the IAB Establishment Panel between 1999 and 2002 and all 
employees who worked at least one day within those establishments between 1997 and 2003. 
For these employees, the data reports the complete employment history between 1993 and 
2006 (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008).  
The LIAB is the only available dataset that combines individual employment histories with 
establishment-level information. This allows for the identification of apprenticeship graduates 
and the analysis of establishment characteristics of recruiting firms. However, since the 
dataset does not contain any grossing-up factors, the descriptive results should carefully be 
interpreted. 
I use the individual Social Security Records to identify staying and switching apprenticeship 
graduates.6 The data does not entail information about successful apprenticeship graduation, 
but instead includes the apprenticeship status. Therefore, I use a regular training duration 
definition to prevent drop-outs in my sample.7 A regular training duration lasts between 800 
and 1,500 days. It starts at the beginning of a school year and ends in the occupation-specific 
exam week between January and July. Additionally, I restrict the data to post-1998 because 
the exact day of a transition from apprenticeship to work was not mandatorily reported prior 
to 1999 (Jacobebbinghaus, 2008). I use the first employment spell after apprenticeship and 
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collapse individual Social Security Records on the establishment level. This procedure 
provides an establishment-level data-set of the first employer after graduation. 
At the establishment-level, I merge two data sources. First, the Social Security Records 
provides additional variables of establishment’s worker composition such as qualification, age 
shares and shares of newly hired and laid-off workers with an apprenticeship degree. Second, 
I merge the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual establishment survey. The IAB 
Establishment Panel provides establishment-level information such as the location, sector, 
legal structure, industrial relations and investments. At the establishment level, I exclude 
agriculture, public and non-profit firms, and firms with more than 50 percent apprentices 
(pure training firms). Furthermore, I use only firms that train or do not train apprentices 
during the entire observation period, which consists of 85 percent of all establishments. 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics  
Dependent variable 
Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables and provides the descriptive statistics. The first 
part describes the dependent and the second the independent variables. The analysis focuses 
on the firms’ recruitment decisions. I define two key dependent variables. First I construct a 
dummy if a firm hires an apprenticeship graduate during a calendar year (incidence). The 
second variable is the share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere among 
all newly hired employees holding an apprenticeship degree during a calendar year (intensity). 
The intensity variable reveals the extent to which a firm hires apprenticeship graduates subject 
to their demand for skilled workers during a given period because the denominator entails all 
new workers holding an apprenticeship degree with and without work experience. Note that 
apprenticeship graduates have no work experience after graduation and experienced skilled 
workers have at least one employment spell after graduation. Apprenticeship graduates 
trained elsewhere comprise 2.3 percent of all intakes holding an apprenticeship degree in one 
calendar year (intensity) and 16 percent of all firms hire apprenticeship graduates trained in 
outside firms (incidence). 
For a robustness check, I use three sub-categories of switching apprenticeship graduates. I 
divide the nominator of apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere into: immediate switchers, 
who found their first job within 10 days of completing their apprenticeship8, occupational 
switchers, who work in an occupation other than what they were trained in9, and switchers 
with an unemployment spell, who need more than 10 days to find a job after their 
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apprenticeship ends. The three groups are not mutually exclusive because occupational 
switchers can find a new job after an unemployment spell. 
Explanatory variables 
The independent variable of main interest is the apprentice-training firm. Around 60 percent 
of all firms train in the final sample (Table 1). Furthermore, I control for a number of 
covariates influencing the recruitment of newly hired workers with an apprenticeship degree.  
First, firms offering specialized career opportunities, internal labor markets and deferred pay 
should be more likely to hire young workers. Specialized career opportunities and internal 
labor markets are usually associated with investments in human capital which is less likely to 
be in demand in the external labor market. Workers and firms are more likely to share 
investments in such firm-specific human capital. This creates a monopsony and leads to long 
employment relations (Becker, 1964; Osterman, 1984; Lazear, 2009; Pfeifer et al., 2013). 
Those firms are also more likely to offer deferred payment schemes (Lazear, 1979; Zwick, 
2012). Specialized careers, internal labor markets and deferred payment are more likely to be 
observed in large firms, firms with a longer than average tenure of skilled workers and firms 
with a low labor turnover. 
Second, firms dominating the local labor market may be more likely to attract apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere (Mühlemann and Wolter, 2011). Dominating firms are firms that 
pay higher wages and offer a more interesting work environment opposed to competitors in 
local labor markets. This enables dominating firms to attract employees from outside firms. 
Dominating firms use a more capital intensive production technology due to their superior 
production processes.10 A further hint for dominating firms is the skill composition of the 
workforce.  
Third, the membership in an employer association plays a major role in firms’ commitment to 
apprenticeship training (Soskice, 1994; Culpepper, 2001). The membership in voluntary 
employer associations depicts a dummy whether the firm is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. Additionally, I control for the existence of a works council (Kriechel et al., 2014). 
Finally, I control for legal structure, ownership status and sectors with dummy variables. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive pattern of newly recruited skilled workers holding an 
apprenticeship certificate for training and non-training firms during a calendar year. The third 
row (“all newly hired skilled workers” which includes graduates and those with work 
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experience after apprenticeship) shows that 86.9 percent of training firms and 47.8 percent of 
non-training firms hire skilled workers holding an apprenticeship degree during a single 
calendar year. These skilled employees with apprenticeship degrees can either be experienced 
workers with an apprenticeship degree (row 5: experienced skilled workers), own 
apprenticeship graduates (row 6: stayer) or apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere (row 7: 
switcher). Graduates, stayer and switcher, are those in their first job after apprenticeship and 
experienced worker are those with at least one employment spell after graduation. 
Training firms that hire skilled employees with an apprenticeship degree can satisfy their skill 
demand with their own apprentices. 51 percent of training firms retain own apprentices (row 
6).11 Own apprenticeship graduates account for 16 percent of the total new skilled workers 
during one calendar year. This number shows that one’s own apprenticeship graduates are an 
important source of skilled labor for training firms. Moreover, 27 percent of training firms 
hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere, which account for 3.3 percent of all new 
hires (row 7). This proportion entails 0.6 percent immediate switchers (row 8), 1.2 percent 
occupational switchers (row 9), and 1.7 percent 12  of apprenticeship graduates with an 
unemployment spell between apprenticeship completion and the first job (row 10).  
Contrary to training firms, only 48 percent of non-training firms hire skilled workers holding 
an apprenticeship certificate during a calendar year (row 3). This represents approximately 
half of the number of training firms. Non-training firms that hire skilled workers primarily 
hire experienced skilled workers (98.5 percent), accounting for 97 percent of all new recruits 
holding an apprenticeship degree during one year (row 5). Additionally, 11.6 percent hire 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere in their first job after graduation- this accounts for 
3.2 percent of total new skilled employees (row 7). The newly hired apprenticeship graduates 
in non-training firms entail 0.7 percent immediate switchers, 1.8 percent occupational 
switchers and percent switchers with an unemployment spell between training completion and 
the first job among all newly hired skilled workers.  
These differences between training and non-training firms at establishment-level translate into 
even larger differences in total numbers on the apprentice-level: only 13 out of 100 
apprenticeship graduates who leave the training firm after graduation find their first job in a 
non-training firm. Also, only four out of 100 apprenticeship graduates find their first job in a 
non-training firm (both numbers not shown in Tables).  
These numbers show that training firms are more likely to hire switching apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere than non-training firms. And, if they hire them, they hire a larger 
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number measured as apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere on all new employees 
holding an apprenticeship degree. 
Findings 
I test the hypothesis whether training firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates 
trained elsewhere than non-training firms by using a pooled cross-section establishment-level 
dataset. Hence, the results should be carefully interpreted because they show an association 
but no causal relationship between apprenticeship training and recruitment of switching 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere.  
First, this section presents estimations of the incidence that firms recruit apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere in their first job. These estimations use a Probit ML procedure 
with standard errors clustered on the establishment-level. Second, I estimate the intensity or 
the proportion of apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere amongst all newly hired skilled 
workers using a corner solution model, the Tobit ML approach. This estimation method is 
appropriate because around 84 percent of all firms do not hire apprenticeship graduates 
trained elsewhere. Third, I investigate the relevance of the three explanations for a lower 
recruitment of apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere by non-training firms: lower 
demand, information disadvantage and apprentices’ preferences. 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 show coefficients and marginal effects for the incidence regression. 
Training firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere in the first 
job. A training firm is 6.5 percent more likely to hire an apprenticeship graduate trained 
elsewhere than a non-training firm. The control variables show expected signs. Larger firms 
are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. Firms with a higher 
portion of workers over 54-years old and a higher share of skilled white-collar employees, 
hire fewer apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. Firms with a higher average tenure of 
skilled workers and single-site firms tend to hire fewer apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere.  
Model 3 in Table 3 presents the estimations for the recruiting intensity. In training firms, 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere account for a larger proportion among all newly 
recruited skilled workers during a calendar year than in non-training firms. The marginal 
effect on the probability to hire those apprenticeship graduates is 6.1 percentage points – 
similar to the previous model – and the marginal effect on the intensity is two percentage 
points13. The control variables show similar influences as in Model 2. 
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Non-training firms have a lower probability in hiring apprenticeship graduates trained 
elsewhere; and, if they hire them, they hire a lower proportion. For this finding, the theoretical 
background section discusses three potential explanations: lower demand of non-training 
firms, information disadvantage of non-training firms and preferences of apprentices. The 
following regressions indicate if the first two explanations are relevant but cannot exactly test 
and reject their impact and should therefore be cautiously interpreted. 
Table 4 investigates the relevance of the demand explanation. Table 4 splits the sample by 
firms demand for skilled workers. If the demand argument is relevant, the recruiting strategy 
of non-training firms should not react to increasing demand, but reacting to the training firms’ 
demands. Hence, I expect a stronger coefficient of training firms in the high-demand rather 
than in the low demand regression.  
Table 4 shows the coefficients of the apprenticeship training firms only but controls for the 
same variables in Table 3 model 2. Training firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere than non-training firms in the high and low demand regime. 
Notably, the coefficient nearly doubles in the high demand regime. This supports the idea of 
the demand explanation. The result for the intensity measure is similar. 
Table 5 investigates the relevance of the information disadvantage argument. Table 5 splits 
the numerator of the apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere into three sub-categories: 
immediate switchers, occupational switchers and switchers with an unemployment spell 
between the completion of their apprenticeship and their first job. If the information 
disadvantage argument is valid, training firms should be more likely to hire immediate 
switching apprenticeship graduates because these are most likely to be the better ones. 
Table 5 shows the coefficients of the apprenticeship training firm for six separate regressions 
which are conditioned on the same control variables as in Table 3 model 2, but use different 
dependent variables. For each dependent variable, the table shows estimates for the incidence 
in the first column and for the intensity of recruiting each of the respective apprenticeship 
graduates amongst all newly recruited skilled employees in the second column. Training firms 
are more likely to hire immediate switching apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere than 
non-training firms (row immediate switchers, column incidence) and they also hire a larger 
proportion of newly recruited skilled employees holding an apprenticeship degree (row 
immediate mover, column intensity). Furthermore, training firms are more likely to hire 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere who change the occupation, but the firms do not 
hire a larger share of apprentice graduates amongst all new skilled recruits. Finally, 
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apprenticeship training firms are more likely to hire graduates with an unemployment spell 
after graduation. If training firms hire them, they also hire a larger percentage. The finding for 
immediate switchers’ supports the information disadvantage explanation. However, both 
checks should be carefully interpreted. Both cannot reject one of the explanations. In addition, 
the individual preferences argument cannot be analyzed with an establishment-level data set. 
Several estimations check the robustness of the results. Table A1 shows the results for small 
firms with less than 50 employees. This sample equally includes training and non-training 
firms whereas, training firms predominate in larger firm size categories. Table A1 confirms 
the main results. Furthermore, the findings are robust for single-site firms, for which joint 
apprenticeship training for several establishments can be ruled out. Using LPM instead of 
Probit and OLS instead of Tobit as well as estimating each year separately does not change 
the findings. The results are robust for several sample restrictions, such as for manufacturing 
firms, service firms, firms with and without collective bargaining contract and firms with and 
without a works council. 
Conclusion 
This paper analyses if and to what extent non-training firms hire switching apprenticeship 
graduates. The paper shows that unlike training firms, non-training firms are less likely to hire 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. Non-training firms that hire apprenticeship 
graduates hire also a smaller share of them as measured as a proportion on all newly hired 
skilled workers with an apprenticeship degree during a calendar year. Furthermore, the 
descriptive results show that only 13 out of 100 apprenticeship graduates who leave the 
training firm after graduation find their first job in a non-training firm. Moreover, staying 
graduates account for 16 percent of all newly recruited employees with an apprenticeship 
degree during a calendar year in training firms. 
The paper discusses three explanations for the key result that non-training firms are less likely 
to hire apprenticeship graduates. First, non-training firms do not demand apprenticeship 
graduates. Second, the group of training firms has an information advantage in evaluating 
apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. They may be better equipped to assess the quality 
of training firms and of apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere. Third, apprenticeship 
graduates prefer to work at training firms. Even if the empirical approach cannot distinguish 
between the three explanations, it cannot reject the first two explanations. 
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These findings have further implication on the understanding of training markets. First, the 
finding supports the idea of employer commitment for a non-poaching agreement. Since 
training firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere, it is easier to 
achieve a non-poaching agreement among training firms because employer coordination 
improves if firms become more homogenous. Employer coordination is generally considered 
to be one of the key ingredients for the functioning of apprenticeship training. Moreover, 
assuming that a firms’ knowledge about the quality of apprentices and outside training firms’ 
increases a firms’ involvement in training, the potential loss from opportunistic (poaching) 
behavior of training firms’ increases equally. 
Second, the findings call for further empirical studies analyzing wage differences for 
switching apprenticeship graduates between training and non-training firms. Analyzing this 
wage difference could contribute to the question of whether asymmetric information exists 
between training and non-training firms in regards to the quality of training firms and of 
apprentices. Such information asymmetries would induce a comparative advantage of training 
firms in hiring skilled workers holding an apprenticeship degree. 
Third, if non-training firms simply do not demand apprenticeship graduates, public 
intervention to increase the supply of apprenticeships should focus on cost-benefit relations 
during apprenticeship to motivate training firms to increase the train intensity. 
This study focused solely on the firm’s perspective. Since employment decisions require 
agreement between the employer and employee, future studies could improve the knowledge 
of recruitment after apprenticeship training taking both perspectives into account. The second 
limitation of the paper the test the relevance of the three potential mechanisms why training 
firms are more likely to hire apprenticeship graduates elsewhere. More rigorous tests are 
encouraged.  
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Table 1: Variable definition and descriptive statistics. 
Dependent variables  incidence intensity 
Switcher Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates 
trained elsewhere (first job after apprenticeship) 
amongst all newly hired skilled workers. 
m: 0.161, 
sd: 0.367 
 
m: 0.023; 
sd: 0.099 
Immediate 
Switchers 
Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates (first 
job after apprenticeship) who found the new job 
within 10 days after completion of the 
apprenticeship amongst all newly hired skilled 
workers. 
m: 0.034, 
sd: 0.181 
m: 0.004, 
sd: 0.044 
Occupational 
Switchers  
Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates (first 
job after apprenticeship) who changed the 
occupation after the apprenticeship amongst all 
newly hired skilled workers. 
m: 0.100, 
sd: 0.300 
m: 0.009, 
sd: 0.060 
Switcher with 
Unemployment 
Spell 
Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates (first 
job after apprenticeship) who suffer an 
unemployment spell after completion of the 
apprenticeship amongst all newly hired skilled 
workers. 
m: 0.112, 
sd: 0.315 
m: 0.012, 
sd: 0.070 
Continued on next page 
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Continued from previous page 
Explanatory variables 
Variable Definition (Mean; Std. Dev.) 
Training Firm Dummy variable; 1 if the firm trains apprentices (0.595, 0.491). 
51-100 employees Dummy variable; 1 if the firm employs between 51 and 100 employees 
(0.106, 0.308). 
101-250 employees Dummy variable; 1 if the firm employs between 101 and 250 employees 
(0.125, 0.330). 
251-500 employees Dummy variable; 1 if the firm employs between 251 and 500 employees 
(0.065, 0.247). 
More than 500 
employees 
Dummy variable; 1 if the firm employs more than 500 employees 
(0.077, 0.265). 
Employment growth Percentage change in number of employees to previous year (0.024, 
0.90). 
High-Skilled 
Employees* 
Share of employees with a university degree amongst all employees 
(0.019; 0.053). 
Skilled Blue-Collar 
Employees* 
Share of blue-collar employees with an apprenticeship certificate among 
all employees (0.323; 0.329). 
Skilled White-Collar 
Employees* 
Share of white-collar employees with an apprenticeship certificate 
amongst all employees (0.379; 0.332). 
Part-time Employees* Share of part-time employees amongst all employees (0.111; 0.212). 
Foreign Employees* Share of non-German employees amongst all employees (0.047; 0.113). 
Old Employees* Share of employees older than 54 years amongst all employees (0.106; 
0.139). 
Leaving Skilled 
Employees 
Share of skilled workers who left the firm during the last twelve months 
amongst all employees (0.159; 0.256). 
ln(capital investments 
per Employee) 
Logarithm of capital investments per employee; capital investments are 
calculated using the perpetual inventory method (10.90; 3.75). 
Works Council Dummy variable; 1 if the firm is covered by a works council (0.369; 
0.482). 
Collective Bargaining 
Contract 
Dummy variable; 1 if the firm is covered by collective bargaining 
agreement (0.561; 0.496). 
Average Tenure Average tenure of all employees in the firm in days (2835; 1663). 
Single-Site Firm Dummy variable; 1 if the firm is a single-site firm (0.742; 0.437). 
N = 19,941, * apprentices are not counted as regular employees in the denominator of stock variables. Source: 
LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003.  
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Table 2: Incidence and intensity of newly hired apprenticeship graduates by training firm. 
 Training Firms Non-Training Firms 
All firms: Incidence Intensity Incidence Intensity 
All newly hired skilled workers 0.869 -- 0.478 -- 
     
Firms that hire skilled workers:     
Experienced skilled workers 0.947 0.808 0.985 0.968 
Stayer* 0.514 0.158 -- -- 
Switcher* 0.268 0.033 0.116 0.032 
of it: Immediate switcher 0.059 0.006 0.020 0.007 
of it: Occupational switcher + 0.164 0.012 0.081 0.018 
of it: Unemployment spell + 0.184 0.017 0.087 0.020 
N= 11,858 training firms and 8,083 non-training firms (upper panel) and N = 10,305 training firms and 3863 
non-training firms in lower panel; + occupational switcher with an unemployment spell are counted in both rows, 
*graduates: first job after apprenticeship. Non –weighted numbers. The denominator in the intensity measure 
comprises all newly hired skilled workers during one calendar year. Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2, 1999-
2003. 
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Table 3: Incidence and intensity of hiring apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere in their 
first job. 
 Incidence Intensity 
 Coef. dydx Coef. 
Training Firm 0.381 
(9.18)*** 
0.065 
(9.18)*** 
0.118 
(8.05)*** 
51-100 employees 0.620 
(12.38) *** 
0.146 
(12.38) *** 
0.138 
(9.10) *** 
101-250 employees 0.947 
(17.80) *** 
0.247 
(17.80) *** 
0.208 
(12.89) *** 
251-500 employees 1.278 
(19.79) *** 
0.382 
(19.79) *** 
0.267 
(14.61) *** 
More than 500 employees 1.952 
(26.77) *** 
0.625 
(26.77) *** 
0.387 
(19.09) *** 
Employment Growth -0.002 
(0.54) 
-0.001 
(0.54) 
-0.001 
(0.61) 
High-Skilled Employees 0.102 
(0.32) 
0.018 
(0.32) 
0.121 
(0.87) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Employees -0.059 
(0.82) 
-0.011 
(0.82) 
-0.002 
(0.08) 
Skilled White-Collar Employees -0.321 
(4.25)*** 
-0.057 
(4.25)*** 
-0.073 
(3.21)*** 
Part-time Employees -0.071 
(0.78) 
-0.013 
(0.78) 
-0.026 
(0.93) 
Foreign Employees -0.015 
(0.11) 
-0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.003 
(0.07) 
Old Employees -0.792 
(5.00)*** 
-0.141 
(5.00)*** 
-0.237 
(4.68)*** 
Leaving Skilled Employees 0.507 
(9.89)*** 
0.090 
(9.89)*** 
0.112 
(7.72)*** 
ln(capital investments per 
Employee) 
0.005 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.91) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
Works Council -0.062 
(1.46) 
-0.011 
(1.46) 
-0.003 
(0.25) 
Collective Bargaining Contract 0.017 
(0.49) 
0.003 
(0.49) 
0.006 
(0.56) 
Average Tenure -0.001 
(10.37)*** 
-0.0001 
(10.37)*** 
-0.0001 
(8.70)*** 
Single-Site Firm -0.344 
(7.28)*** 
-0.056 
(7.28)*** 
-0.089 
(5.24)*** 
Number of Observations 19,441 19,441 19,441 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.24 0.24 0.19 
Dependent Variables: dummy if the firm hires an apprenticeship graduate trained elsewhere (Incidence), 
Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere at first job on all new recruits holding an 
apprenticeship degree(Intensity); Methods: incidence with a Probit and intensity with a Tobit procedure; 
marginal effects calculated at the mean; standard errors clustered on establishment level; further control 
variables: 14 industry, 16 Federal States and 4 year dummies; z-values in parentheses; *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level, Source: LIAB longitudinal 
version2 1999-2003.  
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Table 4: Separate regressions by employment growth. 
 
Incidence Intensity 
 
Coef.   [dydx] Coef. 
Negative employment growth 
Training firm 0.236   [0.042] (3.77)*** 
0.071 
(3.11)*** 
Observations 8205 8205 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.21 0.16 
Positive or zero employment growth 
Training firm 0.440   [0.071] (8.83)*** 
0.135 
(7.67)*** 
Observations 11,736 11,736 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.29 0.22 
Dependent Variables: dummy if the firm hires an apprenticeship graduate trained elsewhere (Incidence), Share 
of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere in their first job on all new recruits holding an 
apprenticeship degree (Intensity); Method: Probit ML (Incidence) and Tobit (Intensity), standard errors clustered 
on establishment-level, z-values in parenthesis, marginal effects calculated at the mean in brackets, Control 
variables as in Table 3: four firm size categories, employment growth, share of high skilled employees, share of 
blue-collar employees, share of skilled white collar employees, share of part-time employees, share of foreign 
employees, share of employees above 55 years, Share of skilled employees who leave the firm during one 
calendar year, log of capital investments per employee, works council, collective agreement, average tenure of 
employees, single site firm, sector, Federal State and year dummies; ; *** significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level; Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Table 5: The incidence and intensity of hiring apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere in 
their first job, coefficient of training firm in six separate regressions. 
 
Incidence Intensity 
 
Coef. Coef. 
Immediate Switchers 
Training Firm 0.214   [0.007] (2.48) ** 0.062  (1.91) * 
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 19,941 19,941 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.20 0.19 
Occupational Switchers 
Training Firm 0.100   [0.009] (1.94) * 0.013  (0.92)  
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 19,941 19,941 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.28 0.27 
Switcher with Unemployment Spell 
Training Firm 0.276   [0.032] (5.97) *** 0.073  (5.27) *** 
Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 19,941 19,941 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.24 0.21 
Table displays the coefficient of training firm from six separate regression; Dependent Variables: dummy if the 
firm hires an apprenticeship graduate trained elsewhere (Incidence), Share of newly hired apprenticeship 
graduates trained elsewhere (first job) on all new recruits holding an apprenticeship degree (Intensity); 
Definition of independent variables: immediate switchers are only immediate switching apprenticeship graduates 
in the nominator, occupational switchers are only apprenticeship graduates who switch the training occupation 
and firm, switcher with an unemployment spell includes only apprenticeship graduates who have an 
unemployment spell between graduation and the first job; Non-displayed control variables: four firm size 
categories, employment growth, share of high skilled employees, share of blue-collar employees, share of skilled 
white collar employees, share of part-time employees, share of foreign employees, share of employees above 55 
years, Share of skilled employees who leave the firm during one calendar year, log of capital investments per 
employee, works council, collective agreement, average tenure of employees, single site firm, sector and year 
dummies; estimation methods: incidence with a Probit procedure (marginal effects calculated at the mean in 
brackets) and the intensity with a Tobit procedure; standard errors clustered on establishment level; z-values in 
parentheses; Source: LIAB longitudinal version 2 1999-2003. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Incidence and Intensity for small establishments with less than 50 employees 
 Incidence Intensity 
 Coef. dydx Coef. 
Training Firm 0.538 
(11.50)*** 
0.050 
(11.50)*** 
0.421 
(10.95)*** 
Employment Growth 0.139 
(2.46)** 
0.012 
(2.46)** 
0.109 
(2.45)** 
High-Skilled Employees 0.253 
(0.73) 
0.021 
(0.73) 
0.303 
(0.93) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Employees 0.004 
(0.005) 
0.0003 
(0.05) 
0.009 
(0.11) 
Skilled White-Collar 
Employees 
-0.228 
(2.24)** 
-0.019 
(2.24)** 
-0.167 
(1.99)** 
Part-time Employees -0.282 
(2.21)** 
-0.024 
(2.21)** 
-0.216 
(2.05)** 
Foreign Employees 0.004 
(0.02) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
0.022 
(0.14) 
Old Employees -0.360 
(2.51)** 
-0.030 
(2.51)** 
-0.306 
(2.50)** 
Leaving Skilled Employees 0.425 
(6.98)*** 
0.035 
(6.98)*** 
0.291 
(6.76)*** 
ln(capital investments per 
Employee) 
0.007 
(1.01) 
0.0006 
(1.01) 
0.005 
(0.90) 
Works Council 0.149 
(2.40)** 
0.014 
(2.40)** 
0.118 
(2.28)** 
Collective Bargaining Contract 0.017 
(0.36) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.022 
(0.56) 
Average Tenure in 1,000 days -0.121 
(7.12)*** 
-0.010 
(7.12)*** 
-0.092 
(6.56)*** 
Single-Site Firm -0.292 
(5.82)*** 
-0.024 
(5.82)*** 
-0.205 
(5.02)*** 
Number of Observations 12,497 12,497 12.497 
Pseudo Rsq (McFadden) 0.09 0.09 0.07 
Dependent Variables: dummy if the firm hires an apprenticeship graduate trained elsewhere (Incidence), 
Share of newly hired apprenticeship graduates trained elsewhere at first job on all new recruits holding an 
apprenticeship degree(Intensity); Methods: incidence with a Probit and intensity with a Tobit procedure; 
marginal effects calculated at the mean; standard errors clustered on establishment level; further control 
variables: 14 industry, 16 Federal States and 4 year dummies; z-values in parentheses; *** significant at 
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level, Source: LIAB longitudinal 
version2 1999-2003.  
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1
 The literature distinguishes several motivations of firms to participate in apprenticeship 
training beyond the investment training motive (see Wolter and Ryan 2011 for a recent 
survey). First, some firms train apprentices as substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers 
because of their lower unit-labor costs (substitution training motive). Second, some firms train 
apprentices because training enforces the reputation of those firms as a superior employer in 
the regional labour market (reputation training motive). (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; 
Mohrenweiser and Backes-Gellner, 2010; Schoenfeld et al. 2010; Wolter and Ryan, 2011; 
Wenzelmann, 2012). 
2
 Backes-Gellner (1996) and Bellmann and Hübler (2014) push a further accentuation of the 
investment training motive. They argue that firms train more apprentices than needed in order 
to increase to pool of skilled applicants in time of unexpected employment growth or labour 
shortage. 
3
 Smits (2006) shows quality differences of training between training firms. 
4
 The arguments so far rely on the assumption that apprentices differ in their ability. However, 
the firm-level analyses in the empirical part cannot differentiate the quality of apprentices. For 
the relevance of the ability of apprentices for training costs compare Muehlemann et al. 
(2013) and for the fact that training firms are able to retain more able apprentices compare 
Wydra-Somaggio and Seibert (2010) and Mohrenweiser et al. (2015). 
5
 An interesting study by Wagner and Zwick (2012) shows that high occupation-level and 
firm-level retention rates are negative stigmas for switching apprenticeship graduates but high 
apprenticeship wages, works councils and establishment size signal high training quality. Geel 
and Backes-Gellner (2011) show that occupational mobility within a cluster of similar 
apprenticeship occupations is accompanied by wage gains and mobility between skills 
clusters results in wage losses. 
6
 Since the data contain individuals subjected to Social Security Contribution, apprentices 
comprise only apprentices in the dual system and no school-based apprenticeships. 
7
 Around 25 percent of all apprentices leave the training firm before the final examination 
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichtserstattung, 2010). This is a major problem in the German 
Social Security Records because the data does not provide a variable indicating the successful 
completion of the apprenticeship. However, the final exams in an occupation take place 
during two consecutive weeks in the first half of the year, and each apprenticeship legally 
ends the day after the final exam. The definition of the regular apprenticeship takes advantage 
of institutional regulation and prevents drop-outs. 
8
 The result does not change if I allow for longer time-spans, since most employer switches 
occur in the first three days. 
9
 Occupational switchers are defined on two-digit occupational code. 
10
 I calculate the capital intensity using the capital-value approach suggested by Mueller 
(2008). 
11
 Indeed, several training firms do not have an apprenticeship graduate every year but 84 per 
cent of training firms with at least one apprenticeship graduate, retain at least one (not shown 
in Tables). 
12
 Occupational switchers can also suffer unemployment before the first job. 
13
 Marginal effects after Tobit at the extensive and intensive margin - results not reported in 
the tables. 
